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ABSTRACT
Interest expense is not an allowable cost in government contracts.
Interest expense is not reimbursed on cost-type contracts nor is it
allowed to be considered when negotiating fixed-price contracts. This
has been the government's policy for over 40 years. Contractor inter-
est expense has become the largest unallowable cost. This research
examines how contractors view interest expense. Additionally, the
reactions of contractors if interest expense were to be allowed is dis-
cussed. Interest theory, financial structure, and the history of the
government's policies on interest expense are reviewed. The
research was conducted through the use of literature search and per-
sonal interviews. As a result of the research, it was concluded that
interest expense should remain unallowable and the current policy
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Interest expense is a significant cost of doing business. Govern-
ment policy for nearly 50 years has been not to allow this expense to
be reimbursed in cost-type contracts. Additionally, this policy is now
followed in determining the cost of a negotiated fixed-price contract.
In the past decade, interest rates have fluctuated more than they had
the entire previous 100 years. Interest expense was already a signifi-
cant cost to contractors before the prime rate reached nearly 20% in
early 1981. As interest rates subsided throughout the 1980s, the
stock market flourished. From January 1987 to August 1987, the
value of corporate stocks rose by billions of dollars. Debt and equity
are the source of a majority of the funds used to finance businesses.
The remainder comes from funds "plowed" back into the business
from retained earnings. Because equity implies the opportunity cost of
investing the same amount of funds into the money market and
receiving the going rate of interest, it must provide a greater return to
the stockholder than he could obtain in the money market. A com-
mon assumption is that equity capital is more expensive than debt
capital. Assuming this is true, does the policy of not allowing interest
force the contractor to use more equity capital, thereby increasing the
overall cost to the government? This thesis attempts to examine ideas
such as the one just presented and to try to discover just how a con-
tractor views interest expense under the current policy. Conversely, it
will look at what the contractor might do if interest were to become
allowable.
B. OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this thesis is to view the unallowability of interest
expense through the contractor's eyes. This research effort examined
the effect of this policy on contractor's cost of capital, investment
decisions, profit, and any other area where a potential impact might
occur.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question was: Should interest expense be
an allowable cost on government contracts?
The subsidiary questions were:
1. Would contractors do anything differently if interest expense
were allowable?
2. Why is interest expense unallowable?
3. What does the unallowability of interest force a contractor to do
with respect to his investment decisions and procedures?
4. What might be the effect on the debt/equity structure of a firm if
interest were to become an allowable expense?
5. Do companies change their finance decision-making process if
interest rates are significantly higher than the normal prime rate
of 7% to 10%?




The research data were collected through personal and telephone
interviews. The background material for this thesis was obtained by
means of a comprehensive search of literature. Interviews were held
with key finance, accounting, and contract personnel in the defense
industry. Government personnel in key positions involving contract
and finance policy were also interviewed. Interviews were non-
attributable to facilitate the obtaining of candid and honest answers.
The literature review involved the conduct of computer searches
through the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) library and The Rand
Corporation in Santa Monica, California. The databases searched were:
1. The NTIS (National Technical Information Service), consisting of
government-sponsored research on technical applications, busi-
ness procedures, and regulatory matters;
2. The ABI/INFORM database, covering the principal articles
appearing in more than 660 business and management periodi-
cals worldwide;
3. The MANAGEMENT CONTENTS database, covering over 90 of
the most current management periodicals that contain retro-
spective information on all aspects of business and management;
4. The Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE);
and
5. Federal Legal Information Through Electronics (FLITE).
A research of all locally held finance and accounting material in
the NPS library applicable to the thesis topic was also conducted.
Information was also obtained through the assistance of the thesis
advisor and through the recommendations of several interviewees.
The purpose of the interviews was to obtain the viewpoint of fed-
eral contractors on the unallowability of interest and to compare and
contrast it with the theoretical and background information. The
interviewees were a mixture of top management, contracting officers,
accountants, finance directors, and business managers.
The interviews were conducted using variants of the subsidiary
questions with an emphasis on the financial decision-making impact.
Interviewees were allowed to discuss any issue they felt was pertinent
to the central theme of interest expense.
The appendix provides a listing of individuals who were inter-
viewed during the research phase of this thesis.
E. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
This thesis evaluated, through the use of interviews, the effects of
the current policy of not allowing interest as an expense on govern-
ment contracts. It is not an attempt to empirically examine the rela-
tionships of the factors but rather a presentation of facts and the ideas,
beliefs, and hypotheses of the individuals interviewed. The individuals
contacted were employed at firms doing significant government busi-
ness. The allowability of interest as it applies to contractor claims for
equitable adjustment will not be examined.
It is assumed that the reader has a general background in business
and in defense contracting terminology.
10
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The remainder of this thesis is organized into four chapters.
Chapter II presents theoretical explanations of the concept of interest
and the financial structure of a typical firm. Presentation of these
concepts helps prepare the reader for the discussions in Chapter IV.
Chapter III includes an examination of the government's concept of
allowability. The purpose of this discussion is to present some of the
criteria that would have to be satisfied if interest expense were to be
allowed. The chapter continues with a synopsis of the regulations
pertaining to interest which have evolved over time. The chapter
concludes with a presentation of data from significant works that have
specifically addressed the thesis topic.
Chapter IV is a presentation of data from the interviews and an
analysis of the comments and ideas presented. The intent is to show
the primary issues that concern contractors with respect to interest
expense and how it is viewed in that context. Where applicable, the
theory and background from the previous two chapters are linked to
the issues and comments presented in Chapter IV.





The intent of this chapter is to present the concept of interest in
general and specifically how it will be discussed in this thesis. Addi-
tionally, a brief overview will be presented on the differences of debt
and equity financing and the capital structure of a typical firm. These
concepts will be discussed only in general terms as to assist the
reader in assimilating information presented in subsequent chapters.
B. CONCEPTS OF INTEREST
A lot of people have their own ideas of what interest is. It is
interesting to note, however, that the earliest concepts of interest
probably do not coincide with most personal beliefs.
1. General Concepts
Interest, or "credit" as it is sometimes called, has been with
the human race since before recorded history. While sometimes con-
sidered "a modern device or even a modern vice," it is only because of
its increased popularity in recent times that it is viewed in this light
[Ref. 1: p. 3]. The earliest loan may have been of seed corn from one
farmer to another. The farmer receiving the corn would be expected
to pay back at harvest time what he received plus some additional
amount. An example of an early attempt to regulate interest is found
in the quotes below:
For example, about 1800 B.C., Hammurabi, a king of the first dynasty
of ancient Babylonia, gave his people their earliest known formal
code of laws. A number of the chief provisions of this code regulated
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the relation of debtor and creditor. The maximum rate of interest
was set at 331/3% per annum for loans of grain repayable in kind,
and at 20% per annum for loans of silver by weight. All loans had to
be accompanied by written contracts witnessed before officials. If a
higher than legal interest rate was collected by subterfuge, the prin-
cipal of the debt was cancelled. Land and movables could be
pledged for debt and also the person of the creditor, his wife, con-
cubine, children or slaves. However, personal slavery for debt was
limited to three years. [Ref. 1: p. 4]
As simple as the idea of interest may sound, early academe
examined the concept of interest and brought forth a surprisingly
diverse group of theories. In a series of books entitled Capital and
Interest Eugen von Boem-Bawerk (1851-1914) presents a History and
Critique of Interest Theories. This volume, initially released in 1884,
contains extensive presentation and analysis of early interest theories.
Boem-Bawerk describes interest as the revenue which is derived from
capital. From this point he explains the difference between gross
interest and net interest; gross interest being all revenues and net
interest being revenues less funds received for the consumption of
capital and any repairs, insurance premiums, and the like. His con-
cern is with net interest only. [Ref. 2: pp. 4-5]
He requires a distinction between originary interest and con-
tract or loan interest Originary interest is described as:
In the hands of one who uses capital for production, the utility of
that capital is demonstrated by the fact that the sum of the products
created with its help is regularly of greater value than the sum of the
costs of the goods expended in the course of production. The
excess value constitutes a certain gain, which we wish to designate
as the originary interest [Ref. 2: p. 6]
His explanation of contract or loan interest is where someone
possessing capital "foregoes earning the originary interest himself,
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and prefers to hand over his capital to another for temporary use in
return for fixed compensation." When this capital is a durable good,
the funds received are classified as rent. For perishable or fungible
goods, it is called interest. [Ref. 2: p. 6]
The entire book consists of discussing various pros and cons
on different theories about what is originary interest. The total dis-
connection of loan interest and originary interest (return on capital) is
fundamental throughout. This is a possible flaw in that inherent in
originary interest is the "opportunity cost" of what return that capital
would bring if put in the hands of another individual (rent, contract, or
loan interest). Various theorists examine the aggregate of originary
interest without considering a link between the two. In one of the
chapters of History and Critique of Interest Theories, the author quotes
the philosopher John Locke: "Money is a barren thing, and produces
nothing, but by compact transfers that profit that was the reward of
one man's labor into another man's pocket." Locke uses the analogy of
land rent and loan interest. When land is employed (rented) it can
then produce, through the efforts of the tenant, more income than the
amount of rent. Just as when money is employed (loaned), the bor-
rower, through his labors, can produce more than the loan interest
[Ref. 2: p. 28]. The key to this analogy is that in both cases the owner
of the capital must first put it in use to make it profitable. Suffice it to
say that a man with $50,000 in his pocket earns nothing until he
either puts it in the bank or acquires capital goods for further
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production and resale. Additionally, the banker must then invest the
$50,000 before he is able to generate a profit.
Three important ideas surface in this discussion. First, in
profit there is inherent loan interest which must be considered before
an economic profit is realized. Secondly, since the earliest discus-
sions of interest theories, profit and interest have been interrelated.
The final point to be made is that interest or profit from capital is
directly tied to the use of that capital. The philosophical arguments
and explanations of the causes of profit/interest are too extensive and
diverse to examine in this thesis. Fortunately, modern financial and
managerial accounting present much more simple concepts concern-
ing interest.
2. Accounting Concepts of Interest
Most financial accounting textbooks have a chapter that pre-
sents a discussion on the time value of money. At the beginning of this
chapter will be a paragraph presenting the theory or concept of inter-
est. An example of the typical explanation provided is: "Interest (i.e.,
the time value of money) represents the excess of resources received
or paid over the amount of resources lent or borrowed at an earlier
date" [Ref. 3: p. 226]. The discussion usually continues with explana-
tions of simple interest, compound interest, present values, future
values, and annuities. Managerial accounting is concerned with the
same elements but places emphasis on using interest rates to discount





Fi = the amount to be received in one year
P = the present outlay to be made
r = the interest rate involved [Ref. 4: p. 595]
To obtain a more lucid explanation on interest rates and their
relationship to capital, a Financial Management textbook must be used.
In Financial Management, the emphasis is on interest rates and how
they allocate capital in the market place. The level of interest rates is a
result of the supply, and demand for, capital funds.
The nominal interest rate on debt is often described using
the notation, k. Nominal interest is a compilation of a pure rate of
interest, k*. and premiums that account for inflation and the riskiness
of debt. This can be expressed as:
k = k* + IP + DP + LP + MP
where:
k * = pure rate of interest
IP = inflation risk premium
DP = default risk premium
LP liquidity premium
MP = maturity risk premium [Ref. 5: p.66]
It is apparent that an expected increase in inflation rates, a
higher probability of default, instruments with poor liquidity, and
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longer debt terms will force a lender to charge a higher rate of inter-
est. There are several theories that explain the term structure of
interest rates but they are not critical to this discussion. It should be
noted that there are other factors that have an influence on interest
levels. The Federal Reserve's policy on the growth of the money
supply is one of the most significant direct effects on the supply of
capital in the marketplace. If the Fed increases the money supply, all
other things remaining constant, short-term interest rates should fall.
Higher interest rates reduce corporate profit. This has a downward
effect on the prices of corporate stock. There are two reasons for this
effect. First, interest is a cost, and as costs increase, profits decline.
Second, with higher interest rates, investors will be motivated to
move their money from the stock market into the bond market to
obtain a better return. The selling of stock by stockholders tends to
reduce the price because it reduces demand for the stock. [Ref. 5:
p. 78]
C. CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORY
A firm has two ways to obtain capital for use: internal financing-
funds obtained from the issuance of stock, and external financing-
funds obtained from outside lenders. The cost of debt received from
lenders is easily calculable. Bonds, mortgages, and notes usually have
clearly stated rates of interest. The interest is a definitive amount and
as an expense is deducted from revenues on the income statement.
Stock or internal financing is not recognized as an expense. When a
dividend is declared, a liability is created, retained earnings are
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reduced, and no expense account is debited. When the liability is
liquidated, an asset account, cash, is credited. This illustrates the dis-
tinct difference in how the two types of capital are viewed. Debt is
like "renting money," with the exception that the interest expense is
not applied as a product cost but as a below-the-line expense. The
payment of dividends to stockholders is analogous to a sole proprietor
removing funds from his business' retained earnings. A debtor's rela-
tionship with a firm and a stockholder's relationship with a firm are
very different. The cost to the firm for debt and stock are also differ-
ent. However, once received, a dollar of debt is no different to a firm
than a dollar of stock. The use of a firm's capital is not tied to its
source.
1. Debt. Eaultv. and the Weighted Average Cost of Capital
The following is a discussion of the interrelationships of debt
and equity financing. General concepts are presented and to the
knowledgeable reader some points may appear to be missing. The
emphasis is on the general relationships between various factors in the
financial structure of a firm and not the precise measurement of those
factors or their makeup.
In financial accounting there is no recorded cost of equity
capital. Financial managers cannot afford to ignore the cost of equity.
The cost of equity to a firm is a function of the current stock price,
expected future dividends, and expected growth of the firm. It is
expressed as a percentage rate, much like interest rates are stated.
The components of a firm's capital structure are typically debt,
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preferred stock, and common stock. When determining the weighted
average cost of capital, each of these components is assigned a cost,
usually in the form of a percentage rate. Then, each of the component
costs is multiplied by its respective weight in the total capital struc-
ture. For instance, if the component cost of debt is 7% and debt is
25% of available capital, the weighted cost of debt capital will be
1.75%. This calculation is computed for each component of capital
and then the products are totaled to obtain an overall weighted aver-
age cost of capital. Most firms will, assuming relative stability between
stock prices and interest rates, attempt to maintain the relative pro-
portions of their capital components. Their goal is to achieve the low-
est average cost of capital given the current economic environment. If
interest rates rise and stock prices fall, the relative proportion of debt
to equity must change if the firm's goal is to maintain a low cost of
capital. [Ref. 5: pp. 250-259]
2. Financial Leverage and Its Effects
The goal of managers of a firm is to maximize shareholders'
wealth. The value of a shareholder's wealth is a function of expected
dividends over time, and the appreciation in the value of their stock.
Several measures of a firm's profitability exist. One such method,
earnings per share, is determined by dividing net income by the num-
ber of outstanding shares of common stock. If a firm decides to
expand and funds this expansion entirely with an issuance of common
stock, then the chances are that earnings per share will drop. This is
a result of a percentage increase in the number of shares outstanding
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that is greater than the percentage increase in income resulting from
the expansion. To avoid this situation, firms will fund expansion with
a combination of debt and equity financing. The introduction of debt
allows the firm to obtain funds for expansion without diluting earnings
per share. In fact, if more funds are obtained through debt than
through equity, earnings per share should increase. This effect is
commonly called financial leverage. Financial leverage can simultane-
ously reduce the weighted average cost of capital, increase earnings
per share, and increase the value of the firm. This relationship is
graphically shown in Figure 2-1. [Ref. 5: pp. 505-509]
As seen in Figure 2-1, the cost of equity, ks , increases as the
firm expands and is usually greater than the interest rate on debt, kd
(a typical scenario). The cost of debt also increases as more debt is
assumed. The value of the firm, V, is the total market value of its
common stock, S (number of shares outstanding times the price per
share) plus the market value of its debt, D. As the amount of debt is
increased, the average cost of capital, ka , declines to its lowest point,
at which the firm's value, V , is maximized. This occurs because the
cost of capital is a significant factor in the profitability of firm. When a
firm uses too much debt, the cost of capital begins to rise. This is
primarily caused by the increase of the default risk premium element
of the nominal interest rate. Creditors do not like to have more at risk
than the stockholders. As this point is approached, interest rates
become higher to compensate for the increased risk. The market
20
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value of previously assumed debt falls because it is providing a level of
return not commensurate with the current level of risk. The combina-
tion of increased cost and lower value of outstanding debt drives down
the value of the firm. The effect of financial leverage on earnings per
share is shown in Figure 2-2. Earnings per share continues to
increase as more debt is assumed. This increase continues past the
point where the value of the firm is maximized. A policy of maximiz-
ing earnings per share can be easily accomplished, however, the
stockholder's shares decrease in value, and in time the increased
earnings per share is more than offset by the decrease in the value of
the stock. At some point in time the firm, because of increasing costs
of capital, is unable to make interest payments and principal when it is
due. When a firm is in default the danger of bankruptcy is very real.
Earnings per share for a firm in bankruptcy should be near zero or
probably negative because common stockholders have the lowest pri-
ority in bankruptcy settlements. This is shown by the downturn in the
EPS line as risk of default is imminent. Figure 2-3 is an overlay of the
three previous figures that clearly shows the interrelationships of the
cost of debt, cost of equity, weighted average cost of capital, value of
the firm, and earnings per share. (Ref. 5: pp. 470, 471, 510]
3. Summary
The general relationships described in the preceding para-
graphs are accepted in most academic circles. The general effects of




















arises in determining the optimal mix of debt and equity for a firm
that achieves the lowest weighted average cost of capital and
maximizes the value of the firm. The relative "flatness" in the middle
of the cost of capital curve in Figure 2.3 suggests that there is not a
great impact on the costs to a firm if they are not at the precise point
of lowest cost of capital. Empirical tests have been made on these fac-
tors in attempt to discover the precise point of optimization but the
results were not definitive. Many ideas have been formulated to assist
financial managers in determining the optimal financial structure.
Through the use of these methods and sound judgment, most financial
structures are formulated. [Ref. 5: pp. 472-473]
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to present ideas on how interest
is viewed theoretically and financially. The theorists are concerned
primarily with what causes interest and how to explain it. The idea
that interest is an effect of the use of capital ties in with the time value
of money. Use of capital is measured by the value of capital and the
amount of time it is in use. Profit is first, then a recovery of interest to
the provider of capital, and then a return to the user of that capital. In
some cases this provider and user were one and the same, hence the
term originary interest The accounting profession has decided not to
attempt to record the cost of equity as expense of the company.
Despite this decision, financial managers must impute this cost when
examining financial choices. The cost of equity capital, debt capital,
and the mix of the two are significant factors when making these
24
decisions. From trie explanations presented, it should be clear that





This chapter provides a discussion of the reasons for costs being
determined as either allowable or unallowable. In addition, it presents
an overview of the history of regulations and various studies concern-
ing the allowability of interest expense in government contracts.
B. THE GOVERNMENT'S CONCEPT OF ALLOWABILITY
The government, because of its sovereign position, is able to play a
large part in the determination of what it will pay when procuring
services, supplies, and equipment. One of the primary methods it
employs in determining what costs and how much of these costs to
pay is through the concept of allowability.
1. Determining Allowability
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 31, Contract
Cost Principles and Procedures, section 31.201-1, states that The
total cost of a contract is the sum of the allowable direct and indirect
costs ..." Before a cost may be included in determining the overall
cost of a contract it must be "allowable." Some of the conditions that
must be considered in determining allowability are:
1. Costs that are not allocable to government contracts.
2. Costs that are construed to have been incurred contrary to public
policy.
3. Costs to the extent considered unreasonable in amount.
26
4. Costs for which recovery was contemplated as part of the con-
tract profit or fee.
5. Costs constituting double screening in respect of government
contracts.
6. Costs specifically cited as unrecoverable from the government by
statute or regulation.
7. Costs cited in the contract as unallowable. [Ref. 6: p. 931
a. Alienability
In general, a cost is considered allocable if it is charge-
able to a particular cost objective, such as a contract, product, product
line, process, or class of customer, in accordance with the relative
benefits received or other equitable relationship. A cost is allocable to
a government contract if it:
• Is incurred specifically for the contract.
• Benefits both the contract and other work, and can be distributed
to them in reasonable proportion to the benefits received.
• Is necessary to the overall operation of the business although a
direct relationship to any particular cost objective cannot be
shown. [Ref. 7: p. 36]
b. Contrary to Public Policy
This condition is not as specific as the others and can be
said to cover items such as bribes, entertaining individuals with the
ability to exert influence on the award of contracts, and other obviously
inappropriate costs. [Ref. 6: p. 95]
c. Unreasonable Amounts
When determining reasonableness, the prudent business
person concept is used. If a prudent business person would incur a
like amount in the course of a similar competitive business
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arrangement, then the cost may be considered reasonable [Ref. 8:
p. 31-8]. There are many things to consider when determining
whether a cost is reasonable, but the statement above, if viewed as a
general one, is sufficient to cover them all.
d. Recovery in Contract Profit or Pee
When it is not possible for the government and the con-
tractor to arrive at an agreed-upon method for estimating a particular
cost, consideration may be provided for that cost to be absorbed in the
profit negotiated. Inasmuch as this is an agreement for treatment of
the cost, subsequent allowance of the costs would be tantamount to
double reimbursement. [Ref. 6: p. 97]
e. Double Screening
In this instance, a contractor may take certain costs that
would normally appear in an overhead account and apply them as
direct costs to a government contract. There is nothing illegal or
undesirable about this practice in the government's view. When the
overhead account that the costs were removed from is applied to the
government contract, all costs similar to those removed that apply to
other contracts are now not allowable for application to the govern-
ment contract. [Ref. 6: p. 98]
f. Statute or Regulation
The primary document that addresses specific costs that
are not allowable is the FAR. Some costs are not allowed in their
entirety and others are limited in amount. Many of the unallowable
costs that are discussed in the FAR are affected by Cost Accounting
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Standards (CAS). The unallowable costs in the FAR apply in the
instances stated therein. If the contract is covered by the CAS, then
those standards apply to it [Ref. 8: p. 31-8]. The intended purpose of
most Cost Accounting Standards is to allow the consistent, fair, and
visible treatment of costs on all government contracts to which they
apply.
g. Costs Cited in the Contract as Unallowable
In negotiating a contract, the parties may experience
difficulty in arriving at an agreeable amount for the cost of a specific
line item. During the negotiation, agreement may be reached to allow
a cost to accumulate up to a specific amount and all costs incurred in
excess of the amount will be unallowable. This arrangement is stated
as a contract clause and may take form in something other than a pre-
set limit. Specific elements of an individual cost may not be allowed or
varying rates of allowability may apply as different levels of cost are
attained. [Ref. 6: pp. 100, 101]
2. Accounting for Unallowable Costs
Once a cost is determined to be unallowable, either expressly
or by agreement between the two parties, it must be clearly identified
and excluded from any billing or proposal. The contractor must have
an accounting system that is adequate enough to allow the government
visibility of the unallowable costs. Visibility consists of the nature of
the amount and the area wherein the cost is accounted. [Ref. 8:
p. 31-8]
29
C. A HISTORY OF INTEREST REGULATION SINCE 1940
1. Treasury Decision fTD) 5000
The first cost principle specifically addressing the allowability
of interest is found in Treasury Decision (TD) 5000. This decision,
issued in 1940, was an outgrowth of the 1934 Vinson-Trammel Act.
The Act was intended to limit the profits on contracts for Navy ships
and Army and Navy aircraft. As military forces rapidly expanded before
the onset of World War II, competitive contracts for increasingly com-
plex equipment became impractical. At the time, there were no con-
sistent cost principles to apply when negotiating either fixed-price or
cost contracts. TD 5000 was the most significant of the decisions
made towards these principles. The wording of the policy on interest
expense can be found in Section 26.9(g)(4). [Ref. 9: pp. 46-48]
Allowances for interest on invested capital are not allowable as costs
of performing a contract or subcontract.... Among the items which
shall as a part of the cost of performing a contract or subcontract or
considered in determining such costs, are the following: ... interest
incurred or earned; bond discount or finance charges ... legal and
accounting fees in connection with reorganizations, security issues,
capital stock issues ...; taxes and expenses on issues and transfers of
capital stock ... [Ref. 9: p. 49]
This decision, which contained many other regulations con-
cerning cost allowability and profits, is often thought of as the birth of
the government's cost principles. The accounting profession viewed
interest as an element of profit, not an element of cost. This was not
as a result of acquisition policy or economic considerations of the time
but is felt to be a primary cause of the decision to make interest
expense an unallowable cost. [Ref. 10: p. 15]
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2. "Explanation of Principles for Determination of Costs
Under Government Contracts"
Two years after TD 5000 was issued, a pamphlet was released
by the War and Navy Departments with the title "Explanation of Prin-
ciples for Determination of Costs." Because of the long title and its
green cover, this pamphlet was called the Green Book. The Green
Book was a supplement to TD 5000 and was the first collection of
formal cost principles used in government contracting [Ref. 10: p. 15].
The following quote is found in paragraph 54 of the Green Book:
Among the items which are not admissible for the purpose of com-
puting the cost of performing a Government contract, the following
may be named:
(a) Allowances for interest on invested or borrowed capital, however
represented ...
(n) Bond discounts or finance charges ...
(p) Special legal and accounting fees incurred in connection with
reorganizations, security issues, capital stock issues ... [Ref. 9:
p. 49]
3. Armed Services Procurement Regulations fASPR)
The ASPR, issued in 1949, furthered the unallowability of
interest expense with only subtle difference. Whereas in the earlier
cost principles interest on invested and borrowed capital was not
allowed, the ASPR only mentions borrowed capital.
15-205.17 Interest and Other Financial Costs (CWAS-NA) Interest on
borrowings (however represented), bond discounts, costs of financ-
ing and refinancing capital (net worth plus long term liabilities),
legal and professional fees paid in connection with the preparation
of prospectuses, costs of preparation and issuance of stock rights,
and costs related thereto, are unallowable except for interest
assessed by State or local taxing authorities under the conditions set
forth in 15-205.41.
31
The failure to mention interest on invested capital may have
been a mere oversight on the part of the writers of the ASPR or it
could have been a unique case of foresightedness. This elimination
could have opened the door for the imputing of interest on capital in
the early 1970s [Ref. 9: p. 50]. The researcher does not believe that
the drafters of the original ASPR were clairvoyant and it would be pre-
sumptuous to assume that this was a mistake of any proportion. Fail-
ure to mention interest on borrowings might have been because often
the costs of invested capital are not considered interest. This is
purely a difference of semantics. The bulk of the costs of borrowing
are clearly stated on the balance sheet as interest expense. Those that
are not can be found under such titles as bond premiums and dis-
counts. Likewise the costs of invested capital, fees, dividends and the
like are found under accounts other than interest expense. The ASPR
covers nearly all of these accounts and those that are not specifically
mentioned are covered by the statement, "... costs of preparation and
issuance of stock rights and all costs related thereto ..." Further dis-
allowances of these type costs may be found in 15-205.23.
ASPR Revision No. 50
Major revisions to the cost principles were made in this 1959
revision of the ASPR. It was recommended that these principles be
used as a guide in costing fixed price contracts [Ref. 10: p. 16]. In
1970, the use of cost principles in the costing of fixed price contracts
of a certain value became mandatory.
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4. Defense Department Circular fDPCl 107
DPC 107 was the government's first attempt to provide an
incentive, through application of profit on the costs of operating and
facilities capital, for a contractor to invest in facilities. They were to
be accumulated in an overhead pool and subsequently allocated like a
normal overhead account. These costs would then be used in deter-
mining the profit factors which mirrored the total capital applied to a
contract. There were separate computations for operating and facili-
ties capital. The computations were not required and few contractors
used the program. After only three contracts were negotiated using
the capital computations, the profit policy was abandoned in 1975.
The procedures were viewed as too complex and they penalized the
contractor with low capital investment or the one that used his capital
efficiently. Additionally, the increase in profit was not viewed as suffi-
cient enough to motivate contractors towards increased capital
expenditure. [Ref. 10: p. 17]
5. Cost of Money as an Element of the Cost of Facilities
Capital
The Cost Accounting Standards Board, in 1976, issued Cost
Accounting Standard (CAS) 414. This standard allows the imputed
cost of using facilities capital to be treated as a cost and added to final
cost objectives much like overhead. Simply stated, the net book value
of tangible capital assets is multiplied by the six-month U. S. Treasury
rate and then this amount is allowed as a cost of facilities capital [Ref.
10: p. 17]. This CAS standard recognizes all costs of supplying facili-
ties capital, whether they were supplied via debt or equity financing by
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using a standard percentage cost. It should be noted, however, that
there was no application of this interest factor on the amount of
working capital employed. As a result of CAS 414 recognizing the cost
of using facilities capital, the argument that interest was an element of
profit, not cost, was nearly decided [Ref. 9: p. 54]. Subsequently,
profit policy was adjusted to remove implicit consideration for the use
of this capital [Ref. 10: p. 17].
6. Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement: POD Profit Policy
Effective August 1, 1987, the Defense Acquisition Regulatory
Council approved a final rule revision to Subparts 204.6, 215.9, 230.7,
and 253.3 of the DOD FAR Supplement. The revision's purpose was to
increase the emphasis on contractor risk and amount of facilities
capital used, entertain working capital needs, and eliminate profit
being applied on individual cost elements [Ref. 11: p. 28706]. Of these
initiatives, only the consideration of working capital requirements
directly addresses the issue of interest expense. While the application
of profit to facilities capital employed may be viewed by some as an
attempt to provide an adequate return on the assets employed inclu-
sive of the cost of financing said assets, it was not. The provided
return's (i.e., profit) purpose was not to provide an adequate return,
but enough of a return to motivate contractors to increase capital
investment. On the other hand, the working capital adjustment was
an overt attempt to compensate the contractor by varying a portion of
profit in concert with the current economic environment.
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The maximum value allowed for working capital adjustment is
4% of total contract cost. The adjustment in profit percentage is
added to the contract type risk category. The formula used to deter-
mine the amount is not intended to be an accurate determination of
contractor working capital costs. Its intent is to provide a general
recognition of these costs depending on the contract length, financ-
ing, and current interest rates [Ref. 11: p. 28711]. The computation is
briefly summarized from Vol. 52 of the Federal Register:
• Contract costs. All allowable costs, General and Administrative
(G&A) overhead, Internal Research and Development (IR&D)
Costs, Bid and Proposal (B&P) expenses, less Facilities Cost of
Capital Money (FCCM).
• Amount financed. The value of the contract not covered by
progress payments. For instance, if a contractor were receiving
80% progress payments, then the amount he would have to
finance would be 20%.
• Amount financed times contract costs. Multiply costs times the
amount financed by the contractor.
• Contract length. A factor is derived that represents the length of
time the contractor has his working capital applied to the con-
tract. This is not the actual length of contract performance but
the amount of time substantive work is performed. Periods of
inactivity or minimal effort should be excluded.
• Working Capital Investment. Multiply the costs financed by the
contractor by the contract length factor.
• Working Capital Adjustment. Multiply the working capital invest-
ment by the same U. S. Treasury rate used to calculate the FCCM.
D. STUDIES INVESTIGATING THE ALLOWABILITY OF INTEREST
The issue of whether or not to allow interest on government con-
tracts has been around for some time. Surprisingly, there are only two
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works that this researcher found that directly examine the subject on
its own merit. Both provided excellent background material on the
subject and are extensively referenced throughout this thesis. Other
studies and working groups have examined the question as it relates to
other elements, such as profit. The following paragraphs summarize
various studies that directly confront the allowability of interest ques-
tion or provide significant information relating to it.
1. Targeting Unallowable Interest Expense
This article, authored by Brigadier General Joseph H.
Connolly, appeared in a Summer 1981 edition of the National Contract
Management Journal A general background is provided that includes
three important Government studies that deserve mention.
a. Joint DOD and Industry Conference-1958
This was the first major joint conference held on gov-
ernment cost principles. Many proponents for allowing interest
expense were present and argued that the policy of not allowing
interest expense was in direct opposition to the rulings of the Internal
Revenue Service, Renegotiation Board, and the Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals. The government, on the other hand, felt that to
allow interest expense would indicate a preference for debt financing.
Additionally, there was concern that a contractor might borrow all the
funds required to complete a government contract and then invest his
own cash in government securities, and thereby draw interest from
the government. [Ref. 10: p. 16]
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b. Defense Industry Advisory Council (DIAC) Working
Group— 1965
The primary points of interest in this study were the
findings by the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) and a Stanford
Research Institute study performed for the Aerospace Industries
Association. LMI found that interest expense had grown to $50-70
million annually. This figure was later found to be closer to $125 mil-
lion. The Stanford study stated that interest expense was now the
largest single unallowable cost. Despite these findings, the govern-
ment still concluded that interest should remain unallowable but that
better ways must be found to compensate the contractor for these
costs. The following are some other conclusions referenced in the
Connolly article:
- Disallowance of interest biased contractors towards leasing and
away from investment.
- Imputing interest on capital would be burdensome and would fur-
ther government's intrusion into industry affairs.
- Profit consideration for interest was inadequate and difficult to
compute.
- Progress payment rates should be increased.
- The government should be more responsive in paying contractors'
bills. [Ref. 10: p. 16]
c. Industry Advisory Council Subcommittee Study— 1971
This study was an extensive look at government contract
financing. Below are two quotes directly from the study explaining the
government's continued policy of not allowing interest expense [Ref.
10: p. 17]:
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First allowing interest would introduce a bias toward debt financing
during a period when the use of debt financing in defense firms may
already be too high.
The second reason ... is that allowing interest focuses government
policy on the sources of capital for defense work, rather than the
uses of capital.
d. Summary
In stating the case for allowing interest expense, the
article includes discussions of whether or not interest is truly a cost or
in fact an element of profit. Connolly concludes that, although interest
expense is not a product cost in the true accounting sense, it is an
expense when determining the amount of tax liability and subse-
quently net income. He feels that CAS 414, which uses a six-month
Treasury rate, is too conservative and does not adjust quickly enough
to volatile interest rates. The implicit allowance in profit for interest
expense has not kept up with the ever-increasing interest rates of the
1960s and the 1970s.
During this period, negotiated profit rates on firm fixed-
price type contracts rose from 11.5% to 12.8%, an overall increase of
11% (actual profit rates depend upon final cost outcome of contract).
This was slightly less than the total DOD average profit increase of
14%. During the same period, however, the interest rate on short-
term business loans increased from 5.0% to 15.8%, an overall increase
of 216%. The prime interest rate rose approximately 230%. [Ref. 10:
p. 19-20)
The author feels that, because of the increased financing
requirements of the time, increased profits could not have
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compensated for the increasing interest expense. The arguments
used in support of not allowing interest expense are centered on the
difficulty of determining which borrowings were incurred in support
of a specific contract, the reasonableness of amounts and rates, the
difficulty in computing working capital funds required on a contract,
and the relief provided by CAS 414. He also mentions the decline of
interest expense as a percentage of sales from the period 1975-1980
as limiting the impact of the unallowability of interest on contractors.
e. Conclusions
Connolly felt that, through the use of CAS 414, govern-
ment financing, and profit consideration, the government has covered
a majority of the contractors' interest expense [Ref. 10: p. 23]. He
stated the reasons for not allowing interest expense remained strong
and interest expense should be compensated through other means. If
necessary, these methods should be adjusted to more equitably reim-
burse contractors (i.e., higher progress payment rates, special financ-
ing, more representative interest rates for CAS 414, and better profit
considerations). [Ref. 10: p. 25]
2. Interest and Federal Contracts: A Perspective
This book was authored in 1982 by James W. Booth, a lawyer
and jurist. He was commissioned by a "Big Eight" accounting firm,
Arthur Andersen & Co., to conduct a study on the history and current
affairs of interest expense in government contracting.
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a. Summary
This work is an exhaustive and extensive look at interest
expense. The author examines the concept of interest from its earli-
est historical conception to present-day rulings and regulations.
Because of his legal background, much of his research is based on
precedents set in previous litigation concerning the allowability of
interest. He examines the unallowability issue on equitable adjust-
ments from a standpoint of interest "in" a claim and interest "on" a
claim. From a historical academic and legal viewpoint, Booth works to
state a case for allowing interest expense to be an allowable cost in
government contracts in all cases. He feels that precedence, both
commercial and governmental, has confirmed that interest expense is
a legitimate cost of doing business, and therefore it should be allowed.
b. Conclusions
Booth states that the government's practices for financ-
ing and payment on contracts are currently not equitable. While CAS
414, the Interest on Contractors' Claim Clause, and the interest provi-
sions in the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 are a step in the right
direction, they are not enough. He clings to the idea that there is an
overlying view by the government that interest is not a cost but an
element of , and that is why, for the most part, it remains unallowable.
[Ref. 9: pp. 167-169]
3. Cost of Capital
"Cost of Capital" was the title of article by Ken Jackson
(Director of Contracts and Procurement, Bolt Beranek and Newman
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Inc.) appearing in the Fall 1974 issue of National Contract Management
Journal
a. Summary
In this article, Jackson attempts to present a case against
explicit recognition and allowability of the cost of contractor capital.
The article was written in the time period that the Cost Accounting
Standards Board (CASB) was considering a method to recognize some
of the contractors' cost of capital. This would eventually take the form
of CAS 414 and the calculations for the Facilities Cost of Capital Money
(FCCM) that was issued in 1976. Jackson supports his opinion with
some of the following statements:
• At the time (1974), federal spending was expected to be reduced,
therefore increased capital investment was not required.
• The Fox Report (Report of the Industry Advisory Council Sub-
committee on Defense Industry Contract Financing) found that
working capital investment on federal contracts was more favor-
able than on commercial contracts.
• The Comptroller General's Defense Industry Study (B- 159896,
dated March 17,1971) indicated that return on investment (ROI)
was substantially greater for government contractors when com-
pared to commercial contractors.
• Contractors would not be motivated to invest because there would
be a simultaneous reduction in profits. At the same time, Jackson
states, there would be guaranteed earnings that would lead to
excessive capitalization and trading on the equity. Furthermore,
there would be motivation to build up inventories beyond what
prudent business practice would dictate. As the discussion con-
tinues, the author brings to light the enormous amounts of infor-
mation required and its variability between contracts and
contractors. He thoughtfully presents a "laundry list" of elements
that must be considered in determining a firm's overall financing
scheme and how they relate to a contract. [Ref. 12: pp. 38-39]
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b. Conclusion
In his short concluding statement, Jackson feels that,
because of the current economic situation and the complexity of trying
to accurately compute the cost of capital, it should not be allowed. He
further states:
Proponents of a change in policy must also be prepared to deal with
emotional responses to any planned change. By developing the logic
of their arguments and being prepared to respond to the arguments
of opponents, this important matter may be decided with one group
remaining objective and being able to deal with the emotional
responses of the other group. [Ref. 12: p. 41]
4. Defense Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR)
The following excerpt is taken directly from the foreword to
the Defense Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR):
In December 1983, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the
Defense Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR). The DFAIR is the
first DoD study chartered to review the interrelationship of pricing,
financing, and markup (profit) policies and to make recommenda-
tions to provide for appropriate integration of the policies. [Ref. 13:
p. i]
Chapter IV of the DFAIR study concerns contract financing
and the Department of Defense's policies specifically about progress
payments. DFAIR focused on progress payments because it was felt
that other types of financing, guaranteed loans, advance payments, and
unusual progress payments were not customary [Ref. 12: p. IV- 1].
a. Summary
The chapter on financing begins with a statement of cur-
rent policies on progress payments and continues with a short history
lesson on how those policies evolved. Uniform policies for progress
payments were not promulgated until 1952. Initially, there was
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concern on what to base the percentage of payment, direct costs or
total costs, and then what percentage was adequate. Many studies
were conducted in the years to follow that recommended changes in
progress payments primarily due to changing policies or interest
rates. In 1971, the Defense Industry Advisory Council (DIAC) recom-
mended that progress payments be limited to no more than bi-weekly
to preclude the possibility of a contractor having a negative investment
in work-in-process inventories. Additionally, items purchased directly
for use on a contract had to be paid for by the contractor before billing
the government for the item. The results of these changes meant an
increase in investment by the contractor. Contracting officers were
directed to add a profit factor to counteract this increase in financing
costs for the contractor. As the Short Term Commercial Loan Rate
rose from 6% in 1968 to 20% in 1979, a need was seen to increase
the rate of progress payments from the current level of 80%. As a
result of this need, progress payments were first increased to 85%
and then to 90%, and a flexible progress payment rate was devised.
Progress payments were paid at the 90% level for large businesses
until May 1, 1985, when they were again reduced to 80%. Many criti-
cisms were discussed in the DFAIR study about the high level of
progress payments (90%) when interest rates fell in the mid-1980s.
[Ref. 13: pp. IV-2-IV-5]
The Grace Commission's Report on Financial Asset Management
opined that, by reducing progress payments from 90% to 80%, the
Government would save 9.4 billion in cash outlays and $1.7 billion in
interest over the next three years. The outlays would benefit DoD,
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and the interest savings would benefit the Treasury Department.
[Ref. 13: p. IV-6]
DOD Inspector General (DOD IG) concurred with these
findings although they arrived at slightly different amounts. These
findings were based upon a belief that there is no relationship between
interest expense, contract financing, and profit. The Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) and General Accounting Office (GAO) recognized
this interrelationship, as shown in the statements below.
CBO View
The major effect of this [Grace Commission] recommendation would
be to slow the flow of cash payments from the government to
defense contractors. The commission assumed that the total cost
over the life of the contracts would be unchanged. Given the slow-
ing of payments, however, defense contractor profits would be
reduced by the added cost of financing a greater portion of the con-
tract. Therefore, negotiated markup and/or fee rates may increase
and offset some or all the estimated savings.
GAO View
GAO does not believe that the savings estimated are realistic. This
assessment is based on the strong belief that contractors will fre-
quently demand and receive terms of value commensurate with the
privilege they are surrendering [progress payments]. Accordingly, if
the recommendation were implemented, GAO doubts that savings of
the magnitude cited would be achieved. [Ref. 13: p. IV- 11]
As stated in the foreword, the primary purpose of DFAIR
was to examine the interrelationships of pricing, financing, and profit.
The area of financing examined, normal progress payments, is pri-
marily used to assist the contractor in financing his work in progress.
In normal business dealings, a contractor must provide his own
"working capital" by either debt or equity financing. The DFAIR study
examines the amount of contract costs the contractor must finance
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over the period of a 40-month "typical" contract. The elements con-
sidered in this study are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it
should be noted that efforts were made to examine the following:
• Average float times for contract costs such as direct material,
labor, overhead, etc.
• Disbursement and Reimbursement lags (float times) were
obtained from the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA).
• Float times were looked at for monthly, bi-weekly, and weekly
progress payments.
A computer simulation was run with these variables using
the Short Term Commercial Loan Rate of 1984. The final result was a
finding that, on a "typical" contract, the investment level for the con-
tractor required a total imputed financing cost of approximately 2% of
total costs [Ref. 13: p. IV- 15]. The simulation was run using different
interest rates but it was determined the relative changes would likely
be the same. Further simulations were run to examine the relation-
ship between current interest rates and the percentage of progress
payments allowed [Ref. 8: pp. IV-17-IV-20]. The conclusions and rec-
ommendations from Chapter IV of the DFAIR report are summarized
in the following paragraphs and can be found on pages IV-31 thru
IV-34 of that report.
b. Conclusions
1. Interest on Working Capital should remain Unallowable.
2. Alternative methods should continue to compensate contractors
for Working Capital Financing.
3. Historically, contractors have absorbed through profit financing
costs equating to 2% of total costs.
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4. Outlay reductions and interest savings of the magnitude cited by
the Grace Commission, CBO, and DOD IG would not be achieved.
c. Recommendations
1. Set requisite level of contractor supplied financing for Working
Capital at 2% of contract costs.
2. Establish mechanisms for adjusting markup objectives in situa-
tions which may vary substantially from baseline expectations.
3. Retain payment policy of 5 to 10 days for Progress Payments.
4. Establish payment policy of 30 days for Delivery (Invoice) pay-
ments.
5. Progress payment frequency should remain on a monthly basis.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter provides an overview of the reasons for costs being
unallowable, a history of interest regulations since 1940, and a look at
several studies conducted concerning the impact of interest regula-
tions. The policy initially promulgated at the onset of World War II
was a result of accounting theory that interest was not a product cost,
therefore it was an element of profit. The other reasons for not
allowing interest expense still exist, but the government now
explicitly recognizes interest expense as a legitimate cost of conduct-
ing business. The various studies conducted that examined the allow-
ability issue were a result of the continuing cry from industry that
interest is an allowable cost. The passion with which they presented
their case was a direct result of their increasing investment and ever-
climbing interest rates. Over time, the government has heeded this
cry; through CAS 414 and the DFAIR study which gave birth to the
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Working Capital adjustment in Weighted Guidelines, the government
has attempted to address the concerns of the contractors.
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IV. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to present data obtained from
interviews and readings. As the data are presented, an analysis and
discussion of the context, emphasis, and supporting information will
be provided. With respect to the interviews, questions were asked
specifically addressing concerns of the researcher on the subject of
the unallowability of interest expense. Interviewees were allowed to
discuss any issue they felt had a direct relationship to the question of
interest expense. This chapter is organized into six sections corre-
sponding to the six most frequently discussed areas by interviewees as
follows: corporate management of interest expense; investment deci-
sions, small business; the DFAIR study; government payment prac-
tices; and profit, business cycles, and procurement initiatives.
B. CORPORATE MANAGEMENT OP INTEREST EXPENSE
Corporate structure and organization play the largest role in how a
corporation handles its interest expense. Large corporations with
many subsidiaries typically conduct all treasury functions at the corpo-
rate headquarters. As is the usual accounting practice, interest
expense is a "below the line" cost on the income statement. From
this, the term "Earnings Before Interest and Taxes" (EBIT) originated.
In a multiple-step income statement, this would commonly be called
income from primary operations [Ref. 3: p. 114]. The purpose of this
separation is to show a distinction between costs that are determined
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by, or partially determined by, the production process and costs that
are completely independent of the process. Interest expense is a
function of the amount of debt held and the rate at which the debt was
obtained (the amount is somewhat controllable; the rate is not). Tax
rates are set by local, state, and federal governments. Specific rates
are not a function of the production process.
With the treasury function of major corporations held at corporate
headquarters, how does the corporation allocate corporate interest
expense to its various subsidiaries? The responses to this question fell
into three areas. The most common response was, "Corporate allo-
cates their interest expense to us as a function of their investment in
our division, or asset base." Another interviewee felt that the interest
was allocated based on the relative amount of sales of the subsidiaries.
All respondents felt the purpose of this was to put a reasonable amount
of interest expense on each of the subsidiaries in order to evaluate
their performance when burdened with the cost of financing their
business. When questioned whether the allocation base was a fair and
equitable method of distributing interest expense, most did not think
so. Unfortunately, they could not perceive of a better way for it to be
accomplished. The reasons for allocating interest expense to a sub-
sidiary relative to its asset base is reasonably clear. It is almost analo-
gous to CAS 414, Facilities Cost of Capital Money (FCCM), which is the
standard that allows cost based on the six-month Treasury note rate
applied to the book value of certain assets. The company applies
interest expense at a rate based on the book value of the assets the
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subsidiary holds. The book value of an asset may not be its true value
to the firm. Typically, depreciation methods are motivated more by
the effects of current tax laws than any other factor. In this sense, the
company will allocate interest expense to an asset that, via its
extremely high rate of return, may have already paid for its initial
capital investment many times over. Vice versa, it is possible to allo-
cate insufficient interest expense to costly assets with low productiv-
ity. A manager with highly productive equipment that quickly pays for
its initial investment is unlikely to be happy with such an arrangement.
For the investment, he is providing a better return to corporate but is
saddled with the expense of investment in equipment throughout
other divisions that do not provide a comparable return. If all capital
was as productive as his, then retained earnings would be greater, less
debt would be required, and therefore the amount of interest expense
to be allocated to his segment would be less. The researcher feels that
this type of allocation can present a distorted picture of a corpora-
tion's subsidiaries. A corporation usually obtains funds for routine
finance needs through the short-term market and possibly as the
result of a cash-flow problem in a particular subsidiary. To allocate
this cost to all subsidiaries penalizes all but the one with the working
capital shortage and, in fact, rewards it.
One interviewee tried to allocate interest expense to subsidiaries
based on what they felt their investment in a particular asset was.
"Simply put, we just couldn't do it. The time and effort weren't worth
the benefits, if there were any." It was obvious to the researcher that
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they had looked long and hard at the problem of allocating interest
expense to particular assets and the costs far exceeded any benefits.
If major corporations allocate their interest expense to their sub-
sidiaries in a manner that is less than satisfactory, how can the gov-
ernment ever expect to be able to allocate corporate interest expense
to a particular contract? If interest expense were to become allow-
able, how would the government handle the allocability and reason-
ableness issues? These questions were posed to all interviewees.
The response was unanimous. The government would say, 'it's my
cost and therefore I want to control it.'" It was felt that, with the gov-
ernment making determinations of allocability and reasonableness, it
would control the firm's capital structure. This would in effect pre-
empt the decision-making role of the board of directors. The DFAIR
study reviewed a previous attempt by the Cost Accounting Standards
Board to develop a standard, similar to CAS 414, that would allow cost
of money calculations on working capital. Their reasons for not being
able to accomplish the task were as follows:
• Identification, measurement, and verification of segment (as
opposed to corporate) operating capital items were difficult.
• Many types of operating capital items made it difficult to establish
an acceptable surrogate for measurement under varying
conditions.
• It was unlikely that individual contract use of operating capital
could be accurately determined.
• Contractors should have an incentive to keep operating capital at
the minimum necessary level. [Ref. 8: p. IV- 10]
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There was significant concern expressed by interviewees that the
government would over-regulate and err on the side of conservatism if
it became involved in these types of determinations. There would be
an increase in the number of auditors trained in the calculation and
allocation of interest expense to federal contracts. This influx of audi-
tors would delay the acquisition process and, because of the diver-
gence of opinions on the subject of what interest expense was
allocable and reasonable, litigation would also increase.
The difficulty in determining the allocation of interest expense is
probably more difficult than determining if it is reasonable. Assume,
for example, that a large corporation has six major bond issues that
were sold over a period of 20 years. The bonds had 30-year maturities
and slightly different stated interest rates. These bonds were issued
for a variety of different reasons, none of which are applicable to
events in the company today. Additionally, the mix of government
versus commercial contracts varied with commercial business cycles
and the level of the defense budget for the past 20 years. The com-
pany is presently incurring interest expense on all six issues and the
expense must be allocated to a specific contract. Determining the
correct or reasonably correct amount would be a difficult task. A Cost
Accounting Standard that could accomplish this would probably be
extremely complicated. In all of the interviews and literature
research, not one innovative idea was presented that adequately
addressed the allocability and reasonableness issue. The researcher
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suggests that this is simply because rewards are not large enough to
justify the time and expense it would take to find a reasonable formula.
C. INVESTMENT DECISIONS
This section examines the impact of the unallowability of interest
on investment decision making. This is an examination of the pro-
cesses by which companies make investment decisions regarding
individual asset procurement and not a general discussion of contrac-
tor investment in government contracts. The intent here was to
attempt to see if companies adjusted their hurdle rates or cost of
capital or took any other actions because interest incurred in an
investment could not be recouped as a cost.
Before covering specific methods of investment decision making,
it is important to note how companies view interest expense in this
context. Comments such as, "It's just an unallowable expense.... Other
than the amount, the fact that it's interest is not a concern" were
common. "Interest expense just isn't an issue in the decision
process" was also a routine response. These comments were stated at
the beginning of many interviews and, as the discussion progressed,
the reasons for them became clear. These reasons will be presented
in this section.
Two methods were principally used by companies to make
investment decisions. The first of these was a variant of the pay-back
method. The company would conduct an engineering economy study
to calculate an expected period within which the asset would pay for
itself. Recapture of the initial investment must be made well before
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the asset has been fully depreciated. For instance, an asset with a five-
year useful life should recapture the initial investment in roughly three
years. This method was used in a company where the corporate policy
was to operate on a cash basis and debt was not desired. The other
method used was to evaluate projects to determine their respective
rate of return (expressed as a percentage) and then compare it to a
predetermined hurdle rate (also expressed as a percentage). If the
rate of return exceeded the hurdle rate, the investment was approved.
The hurdle rate usually consisted of the average cost of the firm's
capital plus another factor, which together would equal the minimum
rate of return necessary for investing in an asset. Subsidiaries were
usually provided with a specific rate of return, from corporate head-
quarters, to use when evaluating capital investments. The following
was an explanation of the process:
At the sector level there were unlimited capital funds. We had to
pass a hurdle rate that implied a blend of the cost of debt and equity.
If an investment's calculated return cleared the hurdle rate the
company would continue to borrow at a leverage factor roughly
equivalent to what they've always done. The implicit assumption is,
the capital structure is optimal for the particular business volume
and they would continue to borrow at the same debt to equity ratio.
To allow interest, all other things remaining the same, would just
increase the return expected. It might make some marginal
investments acceptable.
The statement about the leverage position of the firm is supported
by the discussion concerning financial structure in Chapter II of this
thesis. The quote implies that the cost of capital for the firm is inde-
pendent of the reimbursement policies of its business partners. It is
more a function of the particular financial structure of the firm and is
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also influenced by the external financial market place. It is difficult to
understand how "unlimited funds" could be obtained. The amount of
available funds was inherently limited by the hurdle rate required by
corporate headquarters. The factor added to the average cost of capi-
tal could be increased if management felt the capital budget needed to
be contracted, thereby decreasing the number of projects that would
clear the hurdle. Only highly productive assets would clear the hurdle
rate. This would increase profitability, retained earnings and mini-
mize the requirement for additional financing. The comment, "To
allow interest, all other things remaining the same, would just
increase the return you would expect" further emphasizes the lack of
a significant relationship between interest expense being recouped
directly and factors considered in financing decisions. If interest
were allowed, return would increase because the company would be
receiving reimbursement it had not previously obtained. This
increased return would only happen if policy-makers did not offset
profit at the same time they allowed interest expense. The same
effect would occur if any previously unallowed expense, such as IR&D
expense in excess of the ceiling, was made allowable. The fact is,
increasing profits would also have a similar effect. Hence, we come
full circle to the statements in the opening paragraph of this section
on corporations. Interest expense is viewed much like any other
unallowable expense, as a "profit detractor." Whether it is or is not
allowed has no direct impact on rates used to determine the worthi-
ness of investing in an asset. These rates are a factor of the financial
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marketplace and the overall structure of the firm, not the status of a
particular cost element. Under the pay-back method, the controlling
variables are the depreciation rate and the time it takes for an asset to
pay for itself. As stated earlier, depreciation rates are often predicated
on tax considerations. The time it takes for an asset to pay for itself
could be decreased if interest expense were to become allowable.
However, this same effect would occur if any cost previously unallowed
were to become allowable.
From the corporate standpoint, the unallowability of interest has
been accommodated for several years. It is viewed primarily as a cost
that must be paid out of profits. The reason for routine comments
such as, "It's just not an issue" are twofold. First, the cost of corpo-
rate capital is not tied to the types of contracts held or the mix of gov-
ernment or commercial business. As discussed in Chapter II, a firm
can minimize its cost of capital if it finds the right mixture of debt and
equity. The decision concerning how much leverage to use should be
left to the board of directors. If they use too little debt, then the price
of their stock is below its maximum. If too much debt is used, the
firm becomes risky and the cost of debt capital increases, which also
depresses stock prices because of its negative effect on profitability.
Secondly, the financing decision is separated from the tactical deci-
sion of making an Investment. One interviewee viewed investment
decision making as a two-step process. The decision to invest in a
particular asset or project was a tactical decision. He considered it
tactical because implicit assumptions of risk were assigned to the
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quantitative return of the asset. This risk was usually discussed quali-
tatively before the decision was made. If a piece of equipment was
absolutely necessary to execute the terms of a contract, it might be
procured even if it failed to clear the hurdle rate. When procured, it
would be financed in the same manner as all other assets that had
cleared the hurdle rate. This separation facilitates an understanding
of the minimal impact the unallowability of interest has in investment
decision making.
D. THE SMALL BUSINESS
It is commonly recognized that a small business faces certain
constraints on its ability to compete with larger companies in the
market place. These constraints are most critical in the area of
finance.
The government recognizes the limited financial capability of the
small businessman. Progress payment rates are usually 10% higher for
small businesses and they receive preferential treatment in the
awarding of contracts. While increased progress payments are a large
help, the financial situation for small businesses is still quite difficult.
This is especially true for the small business that is trying to expand
rapidly. The small business that makes incremental increases in pro-
ductive capability faces tight working capital problems. For rapidly
expanding small firms, these problems can become enormous.
One interviewee, recalling his earlier days as a tovernment con-
tract administrator said.
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A small businessman, one that has gone from a business volume of
$0-15 million in seven years, lives and dies risk. Every time he
takes on a large contract, he gambles the entire company.
It was stated that the bulk of contractors did not make it. This
was always a result of a working capital/cash flow problem. Another
interviewee provided this example:
An owner sees a $2 million contract that he feels is within his
capacity to accomplish if he acquires more machines, material,
buildings and personnel. After winning a negotiated contract that
provides 90% progress payments, he must immediately come up
with one million dollars to finance the needed resources. He
obtains the capital through his banker at an annual rate of 12% or
1% per month. If the contract and loan term are both for twelve
months then he incurs a $10,000 expense that must be paid every
month of the contract and will not be reimbursed. He is incurring
costs at about the rate of $150,000 a month and will not receive the
first progress payment until almost six months into the contract and
from then on they typically lag sixty days. In month sixth he has
paid $60,000 in interest and then receives a check for $135,000.
The interviewee's point was that, even though progress payments
help, the contractor must still provide substantial amounts of capital
funds. It may appear that when the progress payments started to
come in the sixth month the situation was no longer critical. How-
ever, what will he do in the twelfth month when the contract is com-
pleted? The final progress payment has yet to be received, final liqui-
dation and payment will not occur for up to 60 days, and the loan
principal amount is due at close of business tomorrow. The negotiated
profit was $200,000. Subtracting approximately $120,000 in
unallowable interest on the original loan leaves an actual profit poten-
tial of $80,000. Sixty days later, the contractor receives $515,000,
which is the $200,000 negotiated profit, the final progress payment of
$135,000, and the difference between billed costs and progress
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payments for the past twelve months. When actual profit is subtracted
from this amount, the remainder is $435,000 that the contractor will
have to finance from the end of the contract until final payment is
received. This requirement would probably force the contractor to
take out another loan. The additional loan is required because of the
time lag between the contractor's cash outlays and when reimburse-
ment, in the form of progress payments or final payment, is received
from the government. This explanation is simplified in that it ignores
the various float times for the payment of invoices by the contractor
and reimbursement timing by the government. It does serve to show,
in a rudimentary way, that a contractor incurs a significant amount of
financing costs even if he receives a high level of progress payments.
This is due principally to high start-up investment requirements, the
progress payment rate, and the timing of payments from the
government.
These financing problems are further complicated by the difficulty
small firms have in obtaining large amounts of growth capital. This is
even more of a problem with small, disadvantaged businesses, com-
monly called 8(a) firms. The 8(a) firm has contracts directed to it by
the Small Business Administration (SBA) without going through com-
petitive procedures. In order to obtain this status, a firm must be
owned (51% of the stock) by a designated minority owner.
We have limited means of raising capital. Because we are a minority
company, 8(a), our ability to raise capital is remarkably restricted.
The principal of the company or the minority owners have to main-
tain 51% of the voting stock. We have already given away 49% of the
stock. When the company is young and struggling, the only
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bargaining chips available are stock in the company and it is given
away at a time when the company has little leverage. If the company
remains successful, it becomes terribly cash strapped. The bankers
will sit on the sideline and say as long as there is a certain amount of
equity they will provide debt financing. Once the amount of equity
available plateaus, the company becomes very risky, and the banks
say, "Wait, no, stop, see this ratio here? We can't loan you any more
money." Was that the intention of the program?
This comment provides strong evidence that, even if a firm
wanted to, it could not use more debt than good common business
judgment would allow. Most bankers, besides raising their interest
rates when firms become riskier, will not lend money to firms with
very high debt-to-equity ratios. One contractor said that, by allowing
interest expense, initial investment and working capital shortages
might not be as much of a problem. While this statement has some
truth, it only emphasizes the fact that interest expense is not reim-
bursable. It fails to see this problem as primarily one of timing. To
allow interest would probably increase a firm's return. This additional
reimbursement would still appear in progress payments that lag
behind actual incurrence of the cost. It is possible that, by increasing
the return, the contractor will recover most of the additional cost that
he has invested in a contract as a result of the delays between cost
incurrence and reimbursement.
As discussed in Chapter III, the DFAIR study found that, on a typi-
cal contract, a firm will absorb, through profit, additional unreim-
bursed financing costs of roughly 2% of the total contract cost because
of the relationships between the timing of progress payments, delivery
payments, profit, and actual cash outlays {Ref. 13: p. IV-32]. The
General Accounting Office, in its review of the DFAIR study, found this
60
cost to be substantially less. The difference is due primarily to the
assumptions made when using models to conduct the study. The
assumptions made by each are stated below:
DFAIR Study
40-month contract
90-percent progress payment rate
5-day progress payment delay
15-day delivery payment delay
Four delivery payments in the last 7 months of the contract
12.02 percent short-term commercial interest rate
Average float time of 3 days
GAO Study
40-month contract
85-percent progress payment rate
5-day progress payment delay
30-day delivery payment delay
Interim delivery payments— consisting of 10 percent of costs
incurred plus profit— beginning 6 months after contact start and
made monthly
9.75-percent short-term commercial interest rate
average float time of 3 days [Ref. 14: pp. 47, 48]
It is not the intent of this paper to discuss the relative merits of
each assumption and explain why the DFAIR study and GAO reached
different percentages for contractor investment in working capital. It
is more important to note the categories on which the assumptions
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were made. Contractors were asked what they felt had the most
impact on their working capital investment. Surprisingly, assump-
tions regarding government payment evoked the most passionate
responses of the interviews. These responses appear in the next
section.
E. GOVERNMENT PAYMENT PRACTICES
All interviewees, save one, believed that the government's actual
practices of making payment were unsatisfactory. The difference
between the GAO and DFAIR assumptions concerning the short-term
interest rates would seem to be one of the largest disparities among
the assumptions (9.75% versus 12.02%) and therefore generates
significant response. However, throughout the interviews, when asked
what rate the government should use to compute FCCM or impute an
equitable cost of interest expense, the consensus was either the prime
rate or the prime plus a point. Most felt that, although the prime rate
was not what most companies could obtain in the debt market, "it's
conservative but reflective of what interest rates in general are doing."
This implies that everyone will be allowed a minimum or lowest rate of
interest expense. This keeps the poorly financed company motivated
to improve its bond rating in order to lower its financing costs.
Because the prime rate is the base rate from which other rates are
derived, an increase in the prime causes an increase in other rates
and the relative differences in the cost of debt between firms remains
the same. Firms felt that the best they could expect was to be treated
fairly and equitably.
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The issue of payment usually came up when the question was
asked, "What are the best reasons you can think of for allowing inter-
est expense?" Invariably, comments were made such as:
To inhibit Congress from coming up with ideas like delaying pay-
ments in the last four weeks of the fiscal year until the new fiscal
year starts just so they can appear to be doing something about the
budget deficit.... To stop the administrative suspension of progress
payments by unhappy contracting officers.
Interviewees complained that the payment of invoices was delayed
routinely between 60 to 90 days. In one discussion about profit, an
interviewee commented,
Something has got to give in the system. They either have to pay us
quicker because our working capital is declining, or improve profits.
One interviewee, when asked if the Prompt Payment Act, with its
provisions for payment of interest on late payment of invoices, was
working, replied:
The problem is that any interest charged for late payment of an
invoice is charged to the budget of the payment office. There is no
account with special funds. It just comes out of their operating
budget. The payment office will tell you that if you want interest it
will cause them to miss payroll and they will have to cut staff and
then the invoices will be even further delayed.
On the issue of progress payments, comments were not as defini-
tive. Two issues surfaced. First, payment was frequently delayed due
to administrative problems, and second, the administrative suspension
of progress payments. The delay of receipt of progress payments is
similar to delay of any payment. In fact, when commenting on the
payment problems, many interviewees discussed late payment of
invoices to include late payment of progress payments. Administrative
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suspension of progress payments is not contrary to any regulation as
long as the contracting officer believes that the contractor is failing to
make progress at a reasonable rate. The effect of suspending progress
payments is similar to the effect of late payment of an invoice. The
contractor incurs a greater cost of the investment in the contract than
he originally anticipated. This increase in cost will reduce the amount
of profit realized on the contract. As a result of these after-the-fact
"renegotiations" of final profit, many contractors feel that suspension
of progress payments should be a judicial decision rather than an
administrative one. In the sense that it does change the original
terms under which profit was negotiated, contractors may have a valid
point. However, the right of the contracting officer to suspend
progress payments existed at the time of profit negotiation. This issue
will eventually be decided in the courts but the effects of it are a very
real cost to a contractor.
Looking at the assumptions of the DFAIR and GAO studies, both
assumed progress payment delays would be 5 days and delivery pay-
ment delays would be 15 and 30 days. From the comments of inter-
viewees, it would seem that these assumptions are not valid. The
assumptions of GAO and DFAIR appear to be based on current policy
and not actual practice. The provisions of the Prompt Payment Act do
not allow classification of an invoice as delinquent unless interest is
paid. As discussed earlier, there is great reluctance on the part of
some contractors to push their claims for interest on late payments. If
the assumptions of the DFAIR study (in 1985) or GAO were to reflect
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actual delay times recently experienced, the amount estimated to be
financed by contractors might increase.
What do contractors cite as the root cause of the current climate
of payment delays? The most common response is the increase in
government auditors and audits. This came about as a result of con-
tract fraud and the public outcry of the mid 1980s. Asked to comment
on the results of all this, one interviewee responded:
DCAA is getting much more involved in auditing, and the kind of
audits they get involved in are not very effective. It slows down the
payment process. I can't believe there's value added for the
expense incurred. If we could depend on the government paying at
exactly 30 days that would be fine. We can't. I'm not crazy about
auditors, but I'm particularly abhorrent of auditors who don't know
what they're doing. I have to deal with bank auditors or external
auditors all the time. Government auditors usually are not as well
trained as their counterparts. The irony is, it gives everyone the
false sense of comfort that someone is watching the store. The
things they are watching are inconsequential. You really have to get
into the bowels of an organization to see if the government's con-
cerns are being protected.
This comment covers the general feeling most contractors have
about the payment process problems and auditors in general.
Contractors admitted that auditors were necessary because of their
own previous transgressions but questioned their training and the
management of audits and the auditing process.
The idea of allowing interest as a cure to payment problems was
put forth by several interviewees. After considering the negative
effects of allowing interest expense, they withdrew their proposals.
The basic problem is delinquent payment and its resulting effect on
the contractor's working capital. Allowing interest would not solve
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the problem and, as shown under the Prompt Payment Act, its effect
as a deterrent to late payment is questionable. Throughout the inter-
views, contractors discussed ways in which the government, through
the implementation of new policies, was causing the contractor to
increase his investment and thereby reduce his return. The unallowa-
bility of interest expense was never a direct cause of any of these
problems and in the end was found not to be a solution either.
F. PROFIT, BUSINESS CYCLES, AND PROCUREMENT INITIATIVES
Interviewees were allowed to discuss any area they felt was
related to the subject of the unallowability of interest expense. One
issue felt by all respondents to be most critical to the thesis topic was
profit. Recent policy changes by the federal government have had a
dramatic effect on how business is conducted in today's defense mar-
ket. Most of these policy changes have dealt either directly with profit
calculation or with the amount of investment a contractor must have in
a contract. The reason for these changes are many but they appear to
be following a cycle. "We had some good years, now I guess its time
for some bad ones." Many contractors feel that the current climate is
as much a result of the way business behaves in cycles as it is a neces-
sary correction of past errors. They seem to be saying that, instead of
incremental correction of profits that were slightly higher than they
should have been, that the pendulum must swing in the opposite
direction an equal amount. There is a very real concern that the new
Weighted Guidelines, coupled with increasing investment by
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contractors, will pose a serious reduction in the return a contractor
receives. One contractor said:
The stock market is a look forward at what people are expecting of a
business. The stock market is worried about a trend of depressing
margins in the defense sector. We were recently in Europe attend-
ing a meeting of our stockholders. They had many questions about
the pressures they see on the company's margins. We told them our
plan on how we intend to mitigate some of these forces but, looking
at the price of our stock, the jury's still out.
It is necessary to consider why this is important with respect to
the unallowability of interest. As discussed in Chapter II, the concepts
of interest and profit are commingled. In Chapter III and this chap-
ter, the premise that interest is a detractor from profit was presented
and discussed from several viewpoints. The link between profit and
interest is strong and to discuss one without the other would not
make good sense. When discussing the economic impact of the gov-
ernment's policy towards profit, one interviewee made the following
statement:
If you take the standard economic paradigm of a competitive market
on the one hand and the regulated public utility on the other and
then compare them to the defense sector there are some significant
differences. What I find striking is, in the first two cases the con-
cept of a competitive rate of return on the invested capital is ulti-
mately the regulator of profit. In the competitive market it occurs
spontaneously. If a firm is not getting the required rate of return, it
goes out of business or shifts out of the market causing the market
to shrink, output falls and the adjustment mechanisms take over. It
isn't perfect but it works. In that context, regardless of whether the
return on capital is called interest, or profits, or whether the indi-
vidual businessman borrows from the bank or borrows from his
grandmother, or saves his own wages; it's all immaterial. If he
doesn't get a competitive profit, things happen.
This interviewee went on to discuss how, in the regulated public
utility sector, regulators must try to mimic this behavior by examining
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the utility's return on invested capital. This invested capital is a func-
tion of the utility's asset base. The manner in which profit is deter-
mined provides the utility with strong incentives to increase its rate
(asset) base. He called this the Averidge-Johnson effect.
Thats why they have posh offices and good looking secretaries,
because if they do manage to economize on capital their rate base
shrinks, and they lose profit. Therefore the utility regulation system
is somewhat dysfunctional. Public regulatory bodies can recognize
this and not allow such costs.
This is similar to the government's policy of making costs unal-
lowable for the reason that there is no benefit derived from the
incurence of a particular expense.
In the defense sector, profit is hostage to limits set in govern-
ment regulations such as the Weighted Guidelines. If a contractor
should turn out to do something extremely brilliant that saves
resources and provides the company with a 50% return, the govern-
ment would cry foul and renegotiate the contract. This removes a
considerable amount of incentive for a contractor to invest in produc-
tivity-enhancing equipment. The new Weighted Guidelines have
procedures to allow a certain percentage of profit (40%) to be deter-
mined based on a contractor's level of investment. The final profit
percentage is then applied to the contract cost. With the current
Defense Department policies of trying to increase investment by
contractors, why was the percentage of profit applicable to investment
only 40%? Applying the final profit percentage to contract costs can
cause an effect similar to the Averidge-Johnson effect in regulated
public utilities. This has always been a problem in defense
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contracting. As long as contract cost continues to be a major variable
in determining the profit on a defense contract, contractors will have
an incentive to keep costs high. In an attempt to find answers to the
inconsistencies stated above, interviewees were queried about the
current profit and investment policies and their effects.
Comments about the new profit policy were direct and to the
point. Comments about investment were a conglomeration of various
policies and government actions. These included over-ceiling Inde-
pendent Research & Development (IR&D), 50% investment require-
ment for special tooling, increased competition, payment delays
(discussed in a previous section), and cost sharing. It is not important
to this thesis whether or not these new policies are flawed. However,
it should be pointed out that most of these policies to increase con-
tractor investment have been implemented in a short period of time.
Simultaneously, new pressures to balance the federal budget have
filtered into the acquisition system, causing contracting officers to
look for ways to reduce the price they are paying for products. One
contractor was upset with the level of his accounts receivables and put
the blame on the government's paying procedures. Upon further dis-
cussion he admitted that his company had started work on several
projects on the basis of a pre-contract cost letter in order to assist
DOD customers that were facing funding difficulties. In the area of
cost sharing, the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program is the most
glaring example of the impact this kind of policy can have. Both
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contractor teams will invest in excess of $.5 billion of their own capital
to fund the R&D effort. An interviewee commented.
The losers of that production contract are in for a long cold winter.
I'm not sure the team awarded the contract will make much money.
I wouldn't be surprised, in the end, if we don't see some sort of
extraordinary contract relief applied to this project.
The additional costs to the government to conduct required
phased competition are not available. Contractors are routinely asked
to do $3 million worth of R&D work for $500,000. One contractor
with nearly 100% government business asked the government to nar-
rowly define the scope of such a contract to $500,000, and it would do
the remaining $2.5 million out of IR&D.
Such comments and actions by contractors highlight the severity
of the investment that they are being asked to assume. At the same
time, profits are not increasing. Investment assumes risk and
increasing risk requires increasing returns. All contractors felt that
current profits were inadequate given the risks they were now being
asked to assume. The researcher feels that the actual cumulative
effect of these polices on investment and profit will not be known
until several years from now. At that point, a majority of contracts
held will have been negotiated under these conditions. It is quite
possible that, if the defense budget continues to fall in terms of
adjusted dollars, there could be a major failure of financially troubled
firms.
The failure of government policy makers to coordinate and analyze
the cumulative effects of the various policies and procedures that
70
affect a contractor's return can result in catastrophic financial difficul-
ties for some firms. Several interviewees commented that any of the
policies standing alone could be dealt with. It is the simultaneous
changing of the entire business equation they have worked under for
so many years that leaves them with very few options to consider.
Allowing interest as a way to offset this sort of problem would be a
poor solution. A contractor stated:
If you're going to keep investment in the defense sector you're
going to have to provide them with the going rate of return and how
that is done, I won't say is trivial, but there are a rich variety of
mechanisms as long as the people administering these things have
some flexibility.
To allow interest as one of the mechanisms would increase
return but add problems, such as the allocation and reasonableness
determination. In a sense, progress would be made in one direction
while new problems would crop up elsewhere. It would make better
sense to raise profit levels in the specific industry where increased
investment was desired.
G. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ALLOWING INTEREST
The primary argument presented in support of allowing interest
expense is that it is a normal cost of conducting business. This argu-
ment has been around for a long time. Several issues for allowing
interest were raised during the conduct of the research of this thesis.
These are summarized below:
• The difficulty small businesses experience in obtaining growth
capital would be reduced if interest were allowable.
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• The burden placed on working capital by the slow payment of
invoices.
• Increased investment by the contractor as a result of programs
such as, cost sharing and 50% investment in special tooling and
test equipment.
During interviews, respondents often initially viewed allowing
interest expense as a possible solution for these issues and profit
reductions. Upon further consideration, they all believed two major
things would take place if interest expense were allowed. First, the
government administrative burden would increase in an effort to
monitor the various amounts of interest expenses incurred by different
companies. Secondly, the government would offset the allowability of
interest with a reduction in profit. A typical response was:
The question on whether or not interest expense should or should
not be allowed is not a particularly important one. Because if it were
allowed, the government would reduce profit to a point where the
return remained the same.
This statement is supported by the profit offset actions of the
government when it implemented CAS 414, Facilities Cost of Capital
Money.
In the course of conducting research for this thesis, the
researcher found only one source that felt interest expense should be
an allowable expense. That source was James W. Booth's work Interest
and Federal Contracts: A Perspective. His conclusions are for the most
part sound, save one. He states:
It seems probable that recognizing that financing costs are costs
rather than profit would, in the long run, reduce rather than add to
prices the Government ultimately pays for its goods, services and
structures. But, even if doing so were to cause an increase in prices
paid directly, that increase would be slight, and it would be more
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than compensated by savings flowing from reduction in the Govern-
ment's administrative and enforcement machine. [Ref. 9: pp. 168-
169]
This statement runs contrary to all the responses received during
interviews and all other material on the subject. The DFA1R study
clearly states:
While DoD has agreed that interest is an ordinary and necessary cost
of doing business with the Government, the policy was to compen-
sate contractors through alternative means. [Ref. 13: p. IV-9]
It may be argued that the alternative means mentioned are not
adequate, but the reasons the government states for not allowing
interest are sound.
Most contractors contended that the allocability question was the
most troublesome to resolve. DFAIR listed the following reasons for
not allowing interest which included all of the reasons presented
during this research.
1. Allowable interest created an incentive toward debt financing. It
raised the possibility of contractors using available cash for
investment and borrowing needed cash to perform contracts.
2. Debt financing can be undertaken for many reasons, several
unrelated to the performance of defense contracts (e.g., payment
of stockholders dividends, corporate acquisitions, retirement of
treasury stock).
3. Reliable cost measurement and allocation methods which show
financing costs of defense contracts (aggregate or individual)
were not available.
4. Allowing interest gave large businesses, particularly cash rich
businesses, a significant competitive advantage over smaller busi-
nesses. [Ref. 13: p. IV- 9, IV- 10]
Why would a firm want the government to allow interest expense?
The only logical reason the researcher could find was to increase the
73
return on invested assets. Academically speaking. Booth arrives at
various benefits that could be realized, but in the final analysis the
effect would be an increase in the costs reimbursed for a contractor
and therefore higher profits. There is reason to believe, based on the
financial structure theory discussed in Chapter II, that the current
policy encourages firms to minimize the average cost of corporate
capital. This is proper and should be encouraged. If the government
were to allow interest, there is a possibility that firms would increase
the proportion of debt they hold. This behavior would be mitigated
somewhat by the factors at work in financial structure theory.
However, based on the behavior exhibited by public utilities and by
defense firms when profit is a function of cost, it is possible that debt
levels would increase a slight amount because the incurrence of more
debt would lead to higher reimbursement.
The increased administrative burden of allocating and making
determinations of interest expense reasonableness is cited by many
contractors as a primary reason for not allowing interest expense. The
present methods for compensating contractors for interest expense
are felt to be inadequate. The complaint from contractors is that final
negotiated profits are often not high enough to cover unallowable
expenses and still provide an adequate return to the shareholders.
This problem has been complicated by the government's new policies
on profit levels and contractor investment.
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H. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter is a presentation of the major issues contractors felt
were pertinent to the thesis research question. The literature
reviewed supported most of the ideas presented by the interviewees.
Most interviewees saw the unallowability of interest as a subsidiary
issue to overall problems such as investment and levels of profit. It
was clear that allowing interest was not a feasible solution to these
problems. Contractors felt the current policy of not allowing interest
was sound. They also felt that the mechanisms in place to compensate
for the unallowability of interest were not keeping up with the current
initiatives in government acquisition.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As a result of this study, the following conclusions and recom-
mendations are presented.
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. The Fact That Interest la an Unallowable Expense Is Not
a Maior Issue With Most Contractors
During the course of discussions, most contractors were
unable to respond to direct questions about interest expense without
opening up the conversation to include other business problems.
When redirected to the primary areas of concern, contractors could
not discuss the problem as it related to actual business practices and
therefore resorted to an academic analysis of the issue. The unallowa-
bility of interest has been government policy for nearly 50 years. Con-
tractors have lived with this fact and have looked towards profit as the
primary means of recouping interest expense. Newer policies, such as
Facilities Cost of Capital Money (FCCM) CAS 414, determining a per-
centage of profit to be based on capital investment, and the Working
Capital Adjustment, have helped to ease the interest expense burden
on profit. Contractors are much less concerned about interest
expense being an unallowable cost than they are about profit levels.
2. The Government's Slow Payment of Invoices Is Causing a
Drain On Contractors' Working Capital
The most emotional discussions with contractors were on the
subject of payment practices of the hovernment. Contractors felt the
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excessive delays in payment forced them to assume a greater invest-
ment than had been negotiated at the start of the contract. The gov-
ernment's assumptions on the expected timing of payments are based
on prescribed policy and not actual occurrence. The delay was felt to
be a result of increased auditing of invoices and inadequate staffing of
payment offices.
3. The Issue of Interest as an Unallowable Expense Is
Directly Related to Profit Policy. Financing Policy.
Investment Policy, and the Timing of Government
Payments
The interrelationships of these elements were reviewed
during the DFAIR study. Contractors feel very strongly that these rela-
tionships exist but do not feel the government always considers the
implications of one policy on another. The DFAIR study was published
in 1985. Since that time, several things have taken place that have
upset the assumptions of the study. Increased audits have delayed
payments to contractors. Cost sharing is forcing contractors to
assume larger amounts of initial investment and risk. Defense budget
cuts are delaying funds for projects and thereby forcing contractors to
provide short-term funding on some projects. The basic business
equation assumed in the DFAIR study has been changed. As a result,
the current profit policy that was largely influenced by the DFAIR
study is probably out of balance.
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4. An Equitable Method of Allocating Interest Expense to
Government Contracts Does Not Exist and Is the Single
Most Important Reason For Not Allowing Interest
Expense
Throughout the interviews and review of the literature, the
problem of allocating interest expense to a particular contract
remained unanswered. Corporate treasuries have difficulty designing
methods to allocate corporate interest expense to their various seg-
ments. While many corporations do allocate this expense, the man-
agers at the segment level question the equitability of the process.
Too often, the reasons for borrowing funds have nothing to do at all
with performance on a particular contract. This is most evident in
large, cash-rich corporations that aggressively manage corporate
working capital.
If a method to accurately allocate interest could not be found,
then a pseudo method would have to be devised. This method would
probably entail the determination of an overall equitable interest rate
and some base over which it would be applied. There is little to be
gained from such a method that adjustment to profit levels could not
accomplish.
5. There Is Little Evidence That the Current Policy Forces
Contractors to Use More "Expensive" Equity Capital Than
Debt Capital
Financial structure theory suggests that a firm has an optimal
weighted average cost of capital that maximizes the value of the firm
while increasing Earnings Per Share (EPS). This was confirmed by
interviewees, who felt the allowing of interest expense would probably
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not change the way their firm was structured financially. The effects
of financial leverage causes most firms to obtain some amount of debt.
Without debt, a firm places all financial risk on the stockholder, which
depresses stock prices and lowers the value of the firm. With the
addition of some reasonable amount of debt, a portion of risk is
assumed by lenders and therefore the EPS for stockholders rises. Too
much debt is a costly position for a firm and there are controls in the
financial market place that inhibit this position.
6. Comparison of Profitability of Commercial Firms Versus
Defense Firms For the Same Period Is a Questionable
Practice
Commercial firms have their business cycles largely deter-
mined by the state of the country's economy. While defense firms are
connected to the country's economy, their cycles are more a function
of the defense budget. During the period of the late 1970s and the
early 1980s, the country's economy was in a recession and the com-
mercial business cycle was in a downturn. However, the defense
budget started to increase rapidly. Simply put, there were funds avail-
able in the defense sector but money was becoming more scarce in the
commercial sector. Competition was still not a major consideration,
so contractors were able to obtain a higher margin in the defense sec-
tor. This higher margin encouraged new firms to develop and com-
mercial firms to move into the defense sector. The increase in avail-
ability of funds and the larger numbers of firms willing to assume
defense contracts is a primary cause of increased competition in the
defense sector today. Over time, this increase in competition will
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cause margins to be depressed and firms to drop out of the defense
sector, if they are able. The economic factors at work in this case are
far more important than whether commercial work and defense work
should pay comparable rates of return. Failure to take these factors
into account has the potential to dramatically affect the defense indus-
trial base.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The Unallowabllitv of Interest Should Not Be Looked At
As a Single Issue
Business managers do not view the unallowability of interest
without taking into consideration those things that have a direct
impact on the incurrence of interest expense. The unallowability of
interest expense is a given parameter within which business managers
have learned to work. They are much more concerned with areas over
which they may exert some control, such as profit, level of investment,
financing, and payment cycles.
2. The Areas of Contract Finance. Profit, and Investment
Must Only Be Studied as Interrelated Disciplines
The DFAIR study was a giant step in the right direction. The
differences between the DFAIR study and GAO's findings should be
resolved. Once the methods, models, and assumptions have been
resolved, an exhaustive study should be conducted on the defense
sector. This study should record both the commercial economic
cycles and trends in the defense budget, and then be used as a
benchmark from which subsequent studies take place. The result of
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the study should be a general profit, investment, and finance policy
that achieves the goal of providing quality and lowest possible cost,
while simultaneously maintaining or expanding the industrial base.
3. Individual Agencies or Contracting Officers Should Not Be
Allowed to Alter the Basic Balance Achieved Between
Interrelated Factors Such as Profits. Investment, and
Financing Once Thev Have Been Properly Established Bv
the Department of Defense
If a profit policy is promulgated to be used in determining
profit on defense contracts, then the terms and conditions under
which the profit policy was derived must be present in the contract.
Allowing such practices as contract cost sharing to take place and
then determining profit based on assumptions that do not include the
risk of those costs is inequitable. Before any agency changes procure-
ment policies that require a decrease or increase of investment on the
contractor's part, it should evaluate and report how the change will
effect the basic assumptions of the study upon which the profit policy
is based.
4. The Current Policy of Not Allowing Interest Expense
Should Be Maintained
The only gain contractors would realize if interest expense
became allowable is a slight increase in profit. Contractors view inter-
est expense as a detractor of profit, therefore, if allowed, their profit
would increase. This assumes that profit would not be offset if interest
were allowable. The government should not be in the business of
determining the amount, timing, rate, or type of capital contractors
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use. The mechanisms required to monitor contractor interest
expense would mandate far greater engagement by the government
than is presently the case. For this reason, contractors do not want
interest to become an allowable expense.
5. The Government Should Be a Better Business Partner
With Respect to the Timing of Progress Payments and
Delivery Payments
The government's policies on the timing of payments to con-
tractors are not unreasonable. In actual practice, the government has
a reputation for slow payment. An improvement in this area would go
a long way towards improving relationships with contractors. A policy
of not conducting extensive invoice audits on firms having a good
record for submitting proper invoices should be implemented.
Prompt payment within 15 days would be reasonable. Firms with a
history of invoice problems should be placed in a special category that
requires more auditing and therefore more delay. A simple classifica-
tion system could be developed and firms would be motivated towards
obtaining the highest classification.
C. REVIEW OP RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Subsidiary Questions
Would contractors do anything differently if interest were an
allowable expense? Contractors would not do anything in the short-
term with respect to their financial structure. The only effect is that
more of the marginal investments would clear existing hurdle rates
because of the increased return on government business. In the long
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run, it is possible that debt would increase slightly if contractors felt
the increase in return would more than offset the increase in the cost
of debt. The amount of this increase is believed to be slight because of
the limiting forces at work in the financial marketplace.
Why is interest expense unallowable? Originally, interest was
unallowable because accounting concepts of the time held that interest
was an element of profit and not a true cost. Coinciding with this
belief are several that still hold true today. Not allowing interest
allows the evaluation of the cost of a contractor's performance without
the benefit or hindrance of his cost of capital. This allows equitable
treatment of contractors whether they are cash rich or debt loaded. It
limits the possibility that a contractor will borrow to complete work
on a government contract and then use his own capital to finance
commercial work. The difficulty of determining why debt is incurred
is another reason. Additionally, measuring and allocating the total
debt of a company is too difficult to accomplish.
What does the unallowability of interest expense force a con-
tractor to do with respect to his investment decisions and proce-
dures? The issue of not allowing interest was found not to be a
consideration in corporate investment decision making. The proce-
dures used usually involved a corporate cost of capital that was deter-
mined by the mixture of debt and equity capital the firm held. In
addition to the corporate cost of capital, firms added an additional
percentage that, in combination, equals the minimum return an
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investment should provide. The unallowability of interest had no
impact on the setting of these rates.
What might be the effect on the debt/equity structure of a
firm if interest expense were to become an allowable expense? There
is strong evidence that the relative proportion of debt to equity would
remain the same if interest were to become allowable. A possibility
exists that firms that were previously under-leveraged would incur
more debt. As long as the increase in debt provided additional return
in an amount that exceeded the cost of more debt, this effect is possi-
ble. The increasing cost of debt would be allowable. However, as the
firm became increasingly levered, the value of its stock would fall and
thereby force the firm to reduce the amount of debt it was carrying.
Do companies change their financial decision-making process
if interest rates are significantly higher than the normal prime rate of
7% to 10%? The processes by which they make financial decisions
would not change. The results of the process might be unique to the
situation. However, the actions of the company would not be any dif-
ferent than a firm with 100% commercial business faced with the
same situation. Once again, the unallowability of interest is not a factor
directly. If profits or government financing policy were not changed
to reflect the increase in interest rates, the probability exists that the
unallowability issue would become more important.
What are the means by which the government makes interest
expense unallowable? The government, because of its sovereign
rights, has the power and authority to make any cost unallowable. To
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accomplish this, contractors are required to make all interest expense
visible to the government. With the costs visible, the job of ensuring
that these costs are not reimbursed is much easier. The requirements
for providing cost and pricing data for certain dollar value contracts
assists in this effort. The ability to see all costs of the contractor
facilitates the removal of interest expense from all chargeable
accounts.
2. Primary Research Question
Should interest expense be an allowable cost on government
contracts? Interest expense should remain unallowable on all gov-
ernment contracts. The reasons for not allowing it are much more
convincing than those presented for allowing it. Under conditions
where increased investment or delayed payments exist, other mecha-
nisms are available to compensate for the increased financing costs to
the contractor. These mechanisms, such as higher profit levels and
improved payment procedures are much easier to implement than to
allow interest expense.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Several areas uncovered during this research left unanswered
questions that went beyond the scope of this thesis. The areas listed
below are possible topics for follow-on thesis or further research.
1. Determine the amount of additional debt a contractor might
incur if interest were to become an allowable expense.
2. Conduct an empirical survey to determine actual delays contrac-
tors are experiencing in the payment of invoices.
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3. Interview contractors in an effort to gauge the long-term effects
of current policies in profit and investment.
4. Conduct a survey of all the methods contractors use to allocate
interest expense within their corporations and decide which, if




The following is a list of individuals interviewed while conducting
research for this thesis.
1. Battershell, Steve M., Property Administration and Accounting,
Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, 28 August 1987.
2. Burton, Thomas G., Controller Defense Products, California
Microwave, Inc., 27 August 1987.
3. Cradduck, James L., Senior Vice-President Corporate Business
Development, Infotek Development Inc., 9 September 1987.
4. Heath, Lori, Finance Department, Applied Signal Technology
(AST), 27 August 1987.
5. Judson, Bob, Director of Contract Research, The Rand
Corporation, 9 September 1987.
6. Kelly, Tom, Hughes Guidance Systems, 9 September 1987.
7. Kinsch, Russ, Director of Finance, ESL a subsidiary of TRW, 28
August 1987.
8. Lum, Gene H., Manager, Government Regulation and Audit,
Defense Products, California Microwave, Inc., 27 August 1987.
9. Maas, Alicia, Accounting Department, Applied Signal
Technology (AST), 27 August 1987
10. Moseley, Ronald H., Finance Director, Lockheed Corporation,
10 September 1987.
11. Musgrave, Bill, CAPT, SC, USN, Office of the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (ASN), 8 October 1987.
12. Palmer, Victor P., Manager Financial Accounting, Westinghouse
Electric Corporation, 27 August 1987.
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13. Reynolds, Peter C, Director, Corporate Finance, Lockheed
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14. Silver, A. H., Manager, General Accounting, Lockheed Missiles
& Space Company, Inc., 28 August 1987.
15. Stockfish, J. A., Economics Department, The Rand Corporation,
9 September 1987.
16. Stone, Mark, Director of Contracts, Applied Signal Technology
(AST), 27 August 1987.
17. Wall, Richard J. LTCOL, USAF, Chairman, DOD Contract Finance
Subcommittee, 21 October 1987.
18. Wall, Richard L., Jr., Senior Contract Administrator, Teledyne
McCormick Selph, 27 August 1987.
19. Wallette. Alonzo V., President, AVW Electronics. 11 September
1987.
20. Wong, Lorrin S. H., Vice President Finance, Chief Financial
Officer, Infotek Development Inc., 9 September 1987.
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